US ramrods the deal in Afghanistan     

Writing for this space almost five months ago, when the deal between the United States and the Taliban had just crumbled, this writer had maintained that the deal was a matter of when and not if. For failing to clinch it before spring would mean that Afghanistan will see the bloodiest summer in its modern history. That “when” seems to have arrived, thankfully.

A week-long “Cessation of Violence” agreement is already in force as the newspaper goes to print. Unlike in the past, this agreement is very finely defined and none of the parties involved—the Taliban, the United States and the Afghanistan government—will be able to oil out of it using diplomatic jargon. The terms are clear. The Taliban will not only not target US troops, but it will also stop targeting Afghan troops. And “targeting” here does not merely mean attacking a base or a picket, it also means no use of piped bombs, IED blasts and other similar attacks. Sources close to this writer have seen the document and they maintain that a more detailed and cast-in-iron document has yet to appear in any negotiation there.

However, that’s just the first step.

If the “Cessation of Violence” agreement is successful, and there’s a big if there, the next round of the negotiations will start. That negotiation includes a possible Afghanistan-wide ceasefire and a written commitment from the Taliban that it will not give a safe haven to “terrorists.”

And this is here that things get tricky. The deal asks the Taliban to negotiate with the Afghan government in power. For the record, the Taliban considers the regime in Kabul illegitimate and hence unworthy of talking. But it will talk nonetheless. This, more than anything, assures that the talk will be just a charade. It is being done for the optics so that gullible people around the world get an impression that this is a negotiated settlement. It is not. It is very evident that the US is ramrodding the deal.

The second part of the deal is even more laughable. It is borderline comical to think that the Taliban (or the US) will honour any written agreement. “Not providing safe haven to terrorists” is a very interesting choice in words. For starters, the US definition of who is a “terrorist” is very different from the Taliban’s. Unless that part is defined and cast-in-iron, both the sides will find themselves in violation of the deal from the minute it is inked. However, at this moment, the US is set on managing optics and has swept the unpleasant things under the carpet.

Meanwhile, events in Kabul also threaten to jeopardise the US plan. After several months of dithering, the results of the presidential elections were finally announced. It was a joke. The final voting data saw a reduction by a massive 28 per cent, leaving Afghanistan’s Chief Executive and once a darling of DC, Abdullah Abdullah, reeling. President Ashraf Ghani, in accordance with the wishes of the United States, declared victory. The US clearly wanted Ghani, who is relatively more palatable when it comes to the deal, to be at the helm than Abdullah Abdullah who has started to style himself as the voice of non-Pashtuns. That was the constituency that once the US championed. Abdullah is now threatening to establish a parallel government. In another era, such a government would have attracted recognition from Iran, Russia, Central Asian Republics and India but much water has flown through the Amu Darya. However, at the bare minimum, Abdullah has the nuisance value. And the US is actively trying to mitigate that.

As Abdullah’s star wanes, Sirajuddin Haqqani’s is clearly on the rise. The leader of the Pakistan-inclined Haqqani Network saw himself writing for The New York Times the other week, styling himself as a peacenik in the while. Since the deal is being brokered by a justifiably exhilarated Islamabad, Haqqani’s word can be taken as Islamabad’s. Sources say that both Islamabad as well as Haqqani wants the initial “Cessation of Violence” agreement to be successful. However, contrary to popular opinion, there’s a limit to Islamabad’s and Haqqani’s influence as well. The Taliban is made up of several factions and while the bigger ones mostly work in tandem, some smaller factions sometimes take their own course, mostly to sabotage things agreed upon by the bigger factions. Then, there is the persistent threat of younger cadres joining Islamic State’s Vilayat Khorasan as well. In the past, the Taliban has been effective in dealing with the threat posed by the Islamic State, but things are about to get a tad more difficult. Haqqani, and others, will find it much more difficult to convince those young cadres, who have only seen war, of the peace. While nothing suggests that elders don’t have an iron grip when it comes to discipline, sporadic events of insubordinations are not unknown.

With Haqqani at the helm of affairs in Kabul, New Delhi will be understandably peeved. Pakistan has pulled the carpet from under India’s feet twenty years after India saw a crack open in the modern version of the Great Game and decided to barge in. What is worse is that India cannot do much about it. Even a whiff of disagreement would make Donald Trump furious. And that is something that the Modi government doesn’t want or can afford at this time. The Trump administration knows that there is nothing that some meaningless platitudes, vis-à-vis “India’s continued role” in Afghanistan, will not set correct. The TV anchors will get their soundbite.

At this point, India shall have to dramatically alter its foreign policy course to remain relevant in Afghanistan. Years of favouring non-Pashtuns over Pashtuns means that India has not very many friends left in the game there.

As the United States ramrods the deal home, the realisation has sunk rather aguishly in New Delhi that it had put all its eggs in one basket and the United States sat on it.