Keep expectations low from the Modi-Xi summit, says China expert Bhutani

President Xi Jingping sees himself in the direct line of the empire builders of the Middle Kingdom (which is English translation of its Chinese name Zhungguo). There isno meeting point between the two leaders Xi and Modi. Xi may visit all the historic temples at Mamallapuram but this will not help  towards solving the boundary issue.  Xi’s view are set out in the White Papers which are in direct contradiction of Indian positions.

In my view, Xi aims to detach India from too close an embrace of USA. But Xi shall not do anything which is contrary to the expressed Chinese views on matters of contention between China and India.

All governments since Mao have pursued a policy of believing in the rightness of its territorial claims all along the Indian frontiers, even if it has no evidence to show that its claims are well founded. But possession is nine-tenths of the law. China has made itself master of Aksai Chin and acquired Shaksgam from Pakistan. Then,China goes on reminding India and the rest of the world that Arunachal Pradesh is Southern Tibet. These are claims that no Indian government can countenance,much less concede.

The present ultra-nationalist government in India is unlikely to concede these demands and China is unlikely to abandon its claims. There is no meeting point between these two antipodean positions. In a practical sense, the only possible solution is to convert the LOC or LAC into an IB and thereby put an end to a dispute which has plagued India–China relations for six decades.

This question has several dimensions. If India were to take a more assertive action, it would leave no scope for compromise. If it leads to an uglier situation, then India would face an actively hostile China in sheer military terms. India is aware that it has no friends in the world community. In case of a showdown, India will face China single handed. No one in his senses would expect help against China from USA under (President) Trump or Russia under (President) Putin. Being totally friendless, India has no option but to make the best of a bad situation.

Trump does not seem to put much weight in even long-standing agreements. He has actually withdrawn from several agreements which were factors of stability in the strategy and the economy of the world. Those who were accustomed to regarding USA as an ally of last resort are now finding that USA under Trump is not an ally after all.

India has no reason to think that Trump shall treat India with much consideration if it came to a showdown with China. Russia of course is glad to hold on to China’s coat tails and  beyond a point  will even discontinue its arms sales to India– if China so demanded.

India has very little choice. Under the best of conditions India cannot expect to have anything more than an uneasy peace with China.

It has been my conviction, which is not shared in the MEA, that India should have moved in the matter of resolving the India–China boundary question definitively and withfinality before building large economic and other relations with China.

This proceeds from an assumption that China is not a friend of India and that China will do everything to operate to India’s disadvantage. From 1963 onwards China has built Pakistan against India in the calculation that this will keep India tied down in South Asia and that India shall have no means or occasion to think in terms of a large role in world affairs. Things like CPEC and BRI should be seenin India as China’s instrumentalities in pursuit of empire, influence, andworld leadership.

For its own reasons, USA does not wish to abandon world leader role and in this it seeks India’s cooperation to keep a check on China. On its part, China is doing what it canto keep India in good humour and thereby stop India from going entirely into the US camp. Beyond that, however, China is not going to accommodate India in anything, whether in UNSC, NSG, FATF, or any other forum.

China’s most recent action in the UNSC in the matter of a discussion of Kashmir is a case in point.

It is possible that China flatters itself that its territorial claims across land boundaries and across the seas are derived from history. But there is no effort in those White Papers to quote or reproduce historical documents, even China’s own, in support of its claims.

There is no doubt that China shall remain a major policy concern for the makers of Indian foreign policy during Modi.2 .

But for this, India needs to build its military and economic power with its own efforts as it is unlikely that India will receive any substantive assistance in this from any foreign country.

Since 1978 China has pursued the path of economic development which is the basis of Chinese military power. In that respect, China has had a march over India. It will be quite some time before India comes to be regarded in the world as an economic and military power. Till then it should be India’s endeavour to ensure that nothing disastrous should happen in India–China relations or on India–China borders.

My answer is an unambiguous no. At the beginning of Modi.1, Obama was steering USA along soundlines in world affairs. In the 2006 election in USA Trump won and since then has shown scant regard to existing treaties and agreements to which USA was a party. It was an error for Modi.1 to think that India could expect anything solid from Trump.  Modi should definitely not be putting all the Indian eggs in Trump’s basket.

The meaning for India was clear: China would stand by Pakistan through thick and thin, although not perhaps to fight a war against India alongside Pakistan. At the same time,it must be clear to China that although China has made great strides in the last 40 years, India today is a rather different place from what it was in 1962. China shall not be in a hurry to bring on a military confrontation with India. Chinese interests are best served if Pakistan remains a quiescent power dependent on China.

Small countries like Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Nepal will naturally gravitate towards a more powerful neighbour. They have little to gain from India. And China is ever ready to spread its economic munificence on other countries.

Without a much better showing in economic achievement, India cannot hope to cast its influence on its neighbours. Instead of following very questionable internal objectives, the Indian government should attend to improving its economic performance.

As I have said earlier, it is an error to build large economic and commercial relations with China without first resolving the boundary question. I am aware that there is a view widely held in India that India should not see its relations with China through the prism of the boundary problem. I do not share that view. On the contrary, I am convinced that economic relations shall in due time become a hostage in China’s hands and that China shall be able to arm twist India into actions or choices which may be contrary to Indian interests.

Other strategic and foreign policy decisions which call for shared approaches and objectives of both China and India shall not achieve fructification as long as India–China relations are driven by China’s patronage of Pakistan.

This is not possible. China has made colossal claims all round, along its land frontiers and across the seas. There is no sign of an international coalition which can keep China’s ambitions in check. At the same time, China has not resiled from its position in respect of the South China Sea, East China Sea, or the Indian Ocean. This brings China in direct collision with many countries including Japan, India, Australia and South Africa.

It should be clear by now that China shall not take steps that may operate to India’s advantage, e.g., membership of NSG, UNSC, etc. It is hopeless to think that high sounding things like SCO and BRICS shall take India–China relations on a path of mutual friendship because out interests do not coincide.

USA and China are today number one and number two economies in the world while India is not even a faraway third. When titans fight, smaller entities suffer.

I am not prepared to concede that Modi.1 pursued a policy of balance between competition and cooperation in relations with China. In fact, we had a near vacuum of policy in the MEA and for the most part India was reduced to responding to what China was doing. For instance, we have had no riposte to China’s BRI. Numerous countries have joined China in BRI: India has been the sole major exception. But India has had no alternative to put forward. So, we have just muddled along from one response to another.

These are just self-compliments. Everything remained the same whether it be the balance of trade between us or other issues. Then, where was the “reset”?The meet in Mamallapuram will see us congratulate ourselves and thank Xi for his ‘magnanimity’. But we cannot remain undeceived for very long.