Indira Gandhi & The Emergency Part III—why the drastic step?

Her election agent Yashpal Kapoor had signed papers on her behalf even before his resignation as a gazetted officer was accepted by the Government in 1971. This, though Kapoor had not been paid any salary from the date of his resignation, and the fact that the state government had constructed a rostrum for her to address a public rally, were the grounds on which Indira Gandhi was unseated by the Allahabad High Court in 1975.

What led Indira Gandhi to take such a drastic step? Did she have to pick up the gauntlet thrown down by JP on the Ramlila grounds? There is no simple answer.

Her problem was much more complex than JP’s, for whom what was happening in the country was like a medieval morality play in which all the angels were on his side. He had no dilem­mas, his mind was full of certitudes. He was more attuned to the rhet­oric of revolution than to the complexities of administering a difficult country.

Indira Gandhi's situation, on the other hand, was agonising for her. Not only was her own political future at stake, her party was under severe strain by the infighting and factionalism. Above all, she was the Prime Minister and she had to worry about the consequences of her exit on the governance of the country. Her mind was a jumble of all these personal and public concerns, which were not easy to dis­entangle.

First, her personal interest. She was aware that if she resigned even before the Supreme Court could rule on her appeal, she would impress some sections of public opinion and could probably come back to power if the court decided in her favour. Had the opposition leaders, particularly JP, left the onus of the decision entirely to her, it is not im­probable that she would have resigned. But they were keen to exploit the situation, exercise their newly gained strength, and demonstrate that they had forced her to resign.

Even before she could file her appeal, to which she was entitled, a delegation of opposition leaders from the Congress(0), JS, BLD, SP and Akali Dal called on the President and presented a memorandum to him saying that ‘a grave constitutional crisis had arisen as a result of Mrs Gandhi continuing to occupy the office of the Prime Minister despite a clear and categorical judicial ver­dict.’ They pressed for her resignation.

In their public utterances she was mercilessly demonised. This exhibition of personal animus brought out the fighter in her and strengthened her resolve to defend herself. She was also worried about the goings on in the party. Though the Congress Parliamentary Party had reiterated its ‘fullest faith and con­fidence’ in her leadership, she was unsure about her pro-term successor’s attitude. Would he let her come back?

As regards her public concerns, Indira Gandhi was almost certain that her party would split if she resigned even temporarily. She was un­sure about the intentions of Jagjjivan Ram and so-called young Turks like Chandra Shekhar, who had not forgiven her for not compromis­ing with JP. Her worst fears were about the opposition coming to power; it was a spectre that haunted her because she believed it would be a disaster for the country. She agonised over all these consider­ations.

Those who would lose power and influence by her exit were quick to soothe her perplexed mind by organising demonstrations of sup­port and loyalty in front of her house. The ideologues urged her to stand firm against ‘right reaction’ and refuse to resign. The CPI passed a resolution to that effect only a day after the Allahabad judgment.

Legally minded people dismissed Justice Sinha as a stickler for the letter of the law. They maintained that while what had been proved (according to the high court) might constitute techni­cal violations of an ‘impractical’ and ‘stringent’ election law, there was no logic in unseating a Prime Minister for minor technical irregulari­ties.

The judgment rested on such technicalities as whether the ser­vices of a gazetted officer had been utilised before his actual date of resignation from government service, and whether the erection of ros­trums by state governments for the security of the Prime Minister, ac­cording to long-standing practice, could invalidate an election.

Judges are human beings and not necessarily like the blindfolded lady holding the scales of justice in one hand and the sword of law in the other. They suggested that Justice Sinha may have been swayed in his opinions by the prevailing political atmosphere. They found it difficult to understand why he gave so much importance to the exact date of resignation of Yashpal Kapoor, the official who had become her election agent, particularly as the resignation did take place and he had not drawn his salary from the date of his resignation letter.

Some made dark references to Justice Sinha’s caste, which was the same as JP’s. In fact a fortnight earlier Indira Gandhi had been told that the judgment would go against her because Justice Sinha was under strong pressure to make it so. She did not do anything about it except mention it to RN Kao, the head of RAW. Others maintained, somewhat faceti­ously, that the country was paying for the mistake of having enacted such a detailed and self-righteous election statute.