The ‘new Syria’: Should Turkey be repatriating Syrians?

As Turkey pushes forward with plans to repatriate Syrian refugees under its ‘temporary protection’ policy, questions arise about the safety and legitimacy of returning millions of people to a country still grappling with instability and the remnants of a devastating civil war.

It has been a month since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria on 8 December 2024. The emerging interim government in Damascus is now led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a coalition of Sunni Islamist groups formerly known as the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant. The group was designated as a terrorist organisation by the UN Security Council’s Al Qaida and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Sanctions Committee in May 2014.

The leader of the HTS and of the new interim Syrian government, Ahmed al-Sharaa — also known as Abu Mohammed al-Julani — has been listed on the UN’s Al Qaida sanctions list since July 2013, predating the HTS’s own designation. Al-Sharaa had ties with both ISIL and Al Qaida before severing them.

Turkey, a NATO member, also officially designates the HTS as a terrorist group. Despite this, the HTS established a security partnership with Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisation (MIT), led by Turkey’s foreign minister Hakan Fidan, from 2010 until mid-2023.

On 19 December 2024, Fidan told West Asia-based news organisation Al Jazeera that Turkey recognised the new Syrian administration as a “legitimate partner” and that the Turkish embassy in Damascus had reopened.

He also called for the HTS to be delisted as a terrorist organisation by the international community, starting with the UN.

Despite this, there is no indication that the UNSC will move swiftly to delist the HTS, as evidenced by its 8 January 2025 meeting, where a Council divided on the Syrian civil war appeared united on this one issue.

A new emerging civil war?

As the situation in Syria remains fragile, tensions continue to rise.

On 19 December 2024, UN secretary-general Antonio Guterres stated that although fighting had eased in many areas, civilians continued to suffer.

On 29 December, the Syrian Resistance Movement (SRM), likely pro-Assad, declared opposition to the new government.

On 4 January 2025, the Iran-backed Alawite Islamic Forum (AIF) accused the HTS-led government of ignoring sectarian violence.

Clashes between the Ankara-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have intensified, while infighting within the HTS coalition is increasing.

On 7 January, Turkey’s Fidan threatened “military operations” against the SDF, further exacerbating tensions.

With these developments, the risk of Syria sliding into a new civil war is increasing.

Can Turkey repatriate Syrians under ‘temporary protection’?

The HTS remains on both the UN and Türkiye’s terrorist lists, making the repatriation of Syrian refugees to the ‘new’ Syria highly problematic. Such repatriation violates the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Refugee Convention), particularly its principle of ‘non-refoulement’ (Article 33).

This principle is binding on all states, irrespective of their status as parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

In December 2016, there were approximately 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. As of 28 November 2024, the Turkish presidency of migration management reported that 2.9 million Syrians were still under temporary protection, with independent estimates now placing the total closer to 3.5 million.

While Turkey has shown significant generosity for more than a decade, the growing political and economic strain, alongside increasing anti-immigrant sentiments, has led public opinion to turn against Syrians. For these reasons and to demonstrate Turkey’s shifting stance towards the ‘new Syria’, President Erdogan recently announced the reopening of the Yayladagi border gate in December 2024 to facilitate the ‘safe and voluntary’ return of Syrians.

Erdoğan and his foreign minister maintain that Turkey is committed to facilitating the safe and voluntary return of refugees, including infrastructure development, with plans to build housing for at least one million returning Syrians.

Turkey’s interior minister declared that 30,663 Syrians returned home by 27 December 2024, following the fall of Assad. Also, UNHCR data from 3 January 2025 suggests that over 115,000 Syrians have returned from countries including Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon since the Assad regime’s collapse.

The refugee dilemma

UNHCR, which has registered 2.93 million Syrians in Turkey, has emphasised that refugees have the fundamental right to return to their country of origin at a time of their choosing, but all returns must be voluntary, dignified, and safe. However, it maintains that Syria’s current situation is too unstable for a significant number of refugees to return safely and sustainably, and this is unlikely to change soon.

Turkey has not yet delisted HTS as a terrorist organisation, and by encouraging the voluntary repatriation of Syrians under its ‘temporary protection’, it is acting contrary to both the UN’s requirements and its own HTS terrorist designation.

This could be seen as a violation of both the spirit and the letter of Article 33 of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, to which Turkey is a party. However, it has a geographic limitation that restricts refugee status recognition to those fleeing Europe, as agreed by it when it signed the Convention.