Battle over access to strategic gateways

A new war is gathering momentum in Ethiopia, with repercussions far beyond its borders. Federal troops are fighting Tigrayan forces as a seven-member alliance of opposition groups challenges Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government. The conflict has spread beyond the Tigray region, with each side accusing the other of starting the latest offensive. Ethiopia’s neighbours are already being drawn into the dispute.

Whether this remains an Ethiopian war depends partly on what is happening at sea. The Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab connect the Gulf’s energy supplies with markets around the world. As both become less secure, every port and potential naval foothold along the opposite African coast grows more valuable.

Already shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has plunged, while Houthi advances threaten Bab al-Mandab, the narrow passage into the Red Sea. Ethiopia has added to the tensions by openly threatening to control the Eritrean port of Assab and reaching an agreement with Somaliland to lease a stretch of shoreline.

Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea became independent in 1993. Abiy has made access to the sea a national ambition, repeatedly pointing towards Assab. He argues that a country of Ethiopia’s size needs a more secure route for its trade. Eritrea hears a claim that might one day be enforced by arms. Ethiopia’s internal war is therefore unfolding alongside a dispute about who will hold power on the western shore of the Red Sea.

The conflict has its own causes. The 2022 Pretoria agreement ended two years of devastating war between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) but it left arguments over territory, displaced people and political authority unresolved. The federal government and Tigrayan leaders accuse each other of undermining the agreement. Now Tigrayan forces have seized airports, and fighting has spread into neighbouring regions.

The TPLF has joined six other groups, including Amhara Fano fighters, seeking to remove Abiy’s government. Their alliance is striking precisely because some of its members were enemies in the last war.

These groups have Ethiopian grievances. They cannot be explained simply as agents of foreign capitals. Yet outside governments have strong interests in whether Abiy survives, whether Ethiopia gains access to the sea, and whether a rival power gains influence over Red Sea routes. Their involvement could make the war longer and harder to contain.

The United Arab Emirates is Abiy’s most important outside partner. Since 2018, Abu Dhabi has supported his government politically and economically, and the two countries have developed military ties. The UAE also has extensive port interests around the Horn of Africa. A close relationship with Ethiopia gives it influence over a large regional power and the trade corridors leading towards the Gulf of Aden. Emirati backing strengthens Abiy’s position as he tries to reduce Ethiopia’s dependence on the port of Djibouti.

Sudan’s civil war has made that relationship more consequential. Camps inside Ethiopia train fighters for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are fighting the Sudanese army. The UAE finances and supports the camps though Abu Dhabi officially denies involvement. Sudan’s army accuses Ethiopia of helping its enemy. Ethiopia rejects accusations of involvement. Whatever the governments say, that one war is supplying fighters to another should alarm the entire region.

Israel’s interest is understandable. The Houthis have attacked shipping and fired towards Israel. Partners near the southern entrance to the Red Sea could give Israel greater diplomatic reach and more security options. Ethiopia’s ambitions and Israel’s concerns are not identical, but they meet at the coast. As danger to shipping grows, their relationship acquires a strategic importance that reaches beyond ordinary bilateral ties.

Israel’s support for Abiy is clearest in its diplomatic and strategic ties with Addis Ababa. President Isaac Herzog’s visit in February affirmed that relationship at the highest level. Israel has also recognised Somaliland, whose 20 km coast Ethiopia leased for 50 years in 2024 to use for access to the sea.

Somaliland’s defence minister says Israel is training its police and military. These moves give Israel a growing role on the African side of the Gulf of Aden. Together, these diplomatic and security ties show that Israel is backing Abiy’s government as it seeks a stronger position in the Horn of Africa.

Egypt has long disputed Ethiopia’s approach to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile. Cairo also shares Eritrea’s view that security arrangements for the Red Sea should remain with coastal states. An Ethiopia able to assert itself over both Nile waters and a Red Sea port would be a more powerful neighbour than Egypt cares to face. Ethiopia’s army chief has accused Egypt and Sudan of backing the alliance now fighting federal troops.

Sudan has its own reasons. Its military believes Ethiopia is helping the RSF, which is trying to defeat it at home. Sudanese authorities deny supporting Tigrayan fighters, yet both governments now regard the other as a possible source of danger across their border. A conflict that stretches from Tigray into Sudan connects two already devastating wars. It also gives outside powers new opportunities to arm their preferred partners.

Eritrea’s reversal is the clearest sign of how far the region’s alignments have shifted. Eritrean troops fought alongside Abiy’s forces against the TPLF in the 2020–22 war. Today Addis Ababa accuses Eritrea of financing its former Tigrayan enemies. Eritrea was excluded from the Pretoria agreement, despite its part in the fighting. For over a year, Abiy’s statements about access to Assab being just “a matter of time” have turned a former ally into a fearful foe. Eritrean and Tigrayan leaders do not need to trust each other to see a common threat in Addis Ababa.

That does not make the opposition alliance a united regional project. Tigrayan and Amhara fighters still disagree over territory, and its seven members have different aims. This means that the war can offer several governments a chance to weaken an opponent. The UAE and Israel see value in a strong relationship with Abiy. Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea see reasons to limit his power.

The last Tigray war killed hundreds of thousands of people and left communities barely able to rebuild themselves. The current conflict is fast spreading across Ethiopia while drawing in neighbours already divided by Sudan’s war, the Nile and access to the sea. The contest over the Red Sea makes every move more dangerous. When foreign governments turn Ethiopia’s battlefields into a means of bargaining over ports and shipping lanes, Ethiopians again pay the highest price.

Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden. More by the author here