In the US-Iran standoff, pray diplomacy wins
Any deal will be imperfect and contested, but imperfect diplomacy is far better than a perfect catastrophe, writes Ashok Swain

Once more, the United States and Iran are standing at the edge of a precipice. Warplanes and aircraft carriers are moving into position, troops are being deployed and dangerous threats being exchanged. In this tense atmosphere, even one wrong move or misunderstanding can trigger a crisis that will become very difficult to contain.
The downing of an Iranian drone this week by the US military in the Arabian Sea shows how quickly small incidents can turn into a major confrontation. There were fresh reports of Iranian forces harassing a US-flagged commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz, trying to stop it for boarding. These are not distant warnings but signs of a confrontation taking shape in real time.
Yet even with this rising tension, a small diplomatic opening still exists. Talks aimed at reviving a nuclear agreement are still on the table, and Washington insists negotiations are continuing even as military forces exchange signals of escalation. This opening is fragile, but it is also the only realistic way to prevent a conflict that could spread from a regional war into a global crisis with huge human and economic costs.
The most dangerous path would be a US military campaign to effect regime change in Tehran. History shows that these projects never produce stability. From Iraq to Libya, the collapse of a central state does not create a new stable governance system; it creates a vacuum.
Iran is not a small or weak country that can be reshaped easily. It is a nation of more than ninety million people with deep institutions, a strong sense of history and a powerful security system. If an outside attack tries to topple the ruling structure, the most likely result is not surrender or reform, but unity against an external enemy. Hardliners would gain power, security forces tighten control and many citizens who dislike the government still rally around the nation when it comes under foreign assault.
Recent experience should also serve as a warning to those who still believe that airstrikes can deliver political transformation. In 2025, Israel and the US carried out major airstrikes on Iranian territory, targeting sites linked to Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure.
Those strikes caused damage, but the regime did not collapse, its security apparatus did not break and its core leadership remained in place. Instead, the State adapted and reasserted control. In recent weeks, the Iranian authorities also managed to suppress yet another wave of protests with extreme force.
Iran may struggle to stop a major US air attack, especially against sensitive targets. That may be true in a narrow military sense. But the truth is that Iran does not need to win a conventional battle. Even if it cannot block airstrikes, it can retaliate across the region in ways that raise the costs for Washington and its partners.
Iran has invested heavily in ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and combat and suicide drones. It also has the ability to strike at military bases and commercial infrastructure that matter far beyond Iran’s borders. A limited strike could therefore trigger a much wider conflict, even if the original plan is to control escalation.
The collapse of Iran would not stay inside Iran; it would spill across West Asia at speed. Iran is deeply connected to the region through alliances, rivalries, armed groups, trade routes and energy networks. A US strike would almost certainly trigger asymmetric retaliation as per Iran’s playbook: Tehran cannot match Washington in conventional power but it does not need to. It has built tools to respond through missiles, drones, proxy forces and pressure on strategic choke points.
The Persian Gulf would be the first place where global consequences appear. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important waterways on earth because 20 per cent of the world’s oil and gas passes through it. Iran does not need to fully shut it down to cause major disruption.
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Limited harassment of ships, missile threats or mining can create panic. If markets fear shipping is unsafe, oil prices can surge within days. Europe, already under economic pressure, would feel the hit immediately. So would poorer countries that cannot afford sudden price jumps.
The battlefield would then widen. Iraq would become one of the first flashpoints. US troops and diplomatic facilities there could face attacks from Iran-aligned militias, pulling Iraq back into instability and violence. Lebanon could be dragged in as well. Hezbollah would face pressure to respond to a major strike on Iran. Syria would be another danger zone. Wars do not always expand through deliberate plans; they often expand through miscalculations, panic and sudden retaliation.
Iran’s instability would also have a direct spillover effect on the Kurdish question, creating new security and political dilemmas for a key US ally — Turkey. Ankara has long feared that weakening authority inside Iran could open space for Kurdish militant groups to reorganise, recruit and move more freely along the Iran-Turkey border.
The humanitarian impact could be enormous. If Iran weakens into internal fragmentation or civil conflict, millions could be displaced. Refugees could move towards Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and the Caucasus. Those states already face economic and security pressures and would struggle to handle large migration flows.
Europe would not be immune either. Migration politics has already divided European societies, and a new wave combined with energy disruption could sharpen instability far beyond West Asia.
The most dangerous long-term consequence would be nuclear. A war aimed at regime change would likely convince Iran’s leaders that the US is committed to their destruction no matter what. In that situation, the incentive to obtain a nuclear deterrent becomes much stronger. A military strike intended to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons could push Iran to pursue them faster and with greater urgency.
Some in the region think Iran can be contained by creating an Islamic NATO, a military bloc ready to share burdens and confront Tehran. The project sounds plausible but such a coalition is far more talk than structure. Sunni-majority states have competing interests, different priorities and unresolved rivalries. Some view Iran as the main threat, while others focus on internal instability, economic survival or different geopolitical rivals.
Pakistan matters because it is a nuclear power, but its central security focus is India. Gulf monarchies may seek American protection yet fear public backlash if they appear openly aligned in a war that could destroy the region’s fragile stability.
That is why containment through military force is an illusion. It creates false confidence that escalation can be managed and costs shared. But once the first strike happens, control quickly disappears. Every side feels pressure to respond harder, faster and more visibly.
Diplomacy is the only tool that can produce verifiable, long-term limits on Iran’s nuclear programme through inspections and monitoring. The diplomatic talks now underway are more than just another round of dialogue; they may be the last meaningful chance to stop the slide towards a war without borders.
Any agreement will be imperfect and contested, but imperfect diplomacy is far better than a perfect catastrophe.
Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden. More by the author here.
