Red Fort blast probe indicates ‘auto-pilot’ terror modules in operation

The investigation into the Red Fort blast and the large-scale seizure of ammonium nitrate has revived concerns within India’s security establishment about homegrown, self-radicalised terror networks. Officials say the emerging Faridabad module bears striking similarities to the Indian Mujahideen (IM), particularly in its composition of educated Indian Muslims, many from financially stable backgrounds.

Intelligence officials, however, highlight a key distinction. The Indian Mujahideen was effectively a façade for Pakistan’s ISI-backed Karachi Project, with funding, strategy and operations controlled across the border. Despite being branded a homegrown outfit, its command structure was entirely Pakistan-driven.

In contrast, the Faridabad module appears to have taken shape independently. Investigators describe it as a cluster of self-radicalised individuals who aligned themselves ideologically with Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and raised their own finances.

While they shared JeM’s views on Jammu and Kashmir, they chose to operate outside the region and were brought together by Maulvi Irfan Ahmed from J&K. Only after the group fully formed did Pakistan-based handlers, operating from Afghanistan, intervene with operational support.

Evidence suggests the group relied on members’ well-paying jobs to generate funds. They managed to procure large quantities of ammonium nitrate along with acetone, hydrogen peroxide and nitric acid, creating an explosive mix that does not require a detonating device and can ignite through heat or friction.

Security officials say the Faridabad module represents a more genuinely indigenous network compared to the IM, with the bulk of its command structure within India. Pakistan’s involvement, they argue, was limited but strategic. By cultivating radicalised individuals in J&K and using them to guide such modules, the ISI reduces direct exposure and ensures terror cells can run on an “auto-pilot” mode, leaving minimal traces leading back to Islamabad.

Officials warn that this indirect model is likely to become Pakistan’s preferred strategy. With the threat of returning to the FATF Grey List and the memory of India’s forceful response under Operation Sindoor following the Pahalgam attack, Pakistan is expected to avoid overt links that could provoke diplomatic or military consequences.

Security agencies now face the challenge of countering a decentralised and self-financing threat—one they fear could proliferate without clear, traceable foreign command structures.

With IANS Inputs