An idiot’s guide to diplomacy

Saudi Arabia has spent decades preparing for a confrontation with Iran. It has purchased some of the world’s most advanced weapons from the West, built a close security partnership with the United States and competed with Tehran for influence across West Asia.

Yet, as Trump’s stop-start war against Iran makes the region dangerously volatile, it’s doing everything possible to avoid being seen as a direct belligerent. This, even after it signed a ‘strategic mutual defence agreement’ with nuclear-power Pakistan in 2025.

This is not a sign of Saudi indecision or weakness, but of a strategic realism born of a clear understanding of the limits of military power.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman seems to recognise what the US and Israel and even the UAE refuse to acknowledge. The US and Israel can destroy some Iranian military installations, energy facilities and civilian infrastructure. But even largescale destruction is not the same as a political victory. Neither country has a credible plan to enforce a regime change in Iran — a large country of more than 90 million people with a strong state tradition and capacity for asymmetric retaliation.

The war has once again demonstrated the gap beyond destructive capability and strategic control. Far from capitulating, Iran has struck US bases and interests across the region, disrupted maritime traffic and mobilised allied armed groups in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen.

Saudi Arabia is dangerously exposed to these consequences. Its oil installations, desalination plants, ports, airports, electricity networks and new data centres are easy targets for Iran. The September 2019 attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities by the Houthis were an unforgettable warning. Relatively inexpensive drones and missiles temporarily disabled about half of Saudi oil production. Billions of dollars spent on sophisticated aircraft and air defence systems could not eliminate the vulnerability of dispersed infrastructure.

The current war has heightened that vulnerability. Iran and its allies can attack Saudi Arabia from several directions. Iranian missiles and drones can cross the Gulf. Armed groups in Iraq can strike from the north. The Houthis can attack from Yemen and disrupt shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb. Saudi Arabia must also protect a vast territory and two long coastlines. Even an exceptionally well-equipped military is not an impenetrable shield against sustained, multidirectional attacks.

Saudi Arabia fought a war with the Houthis for seven years (2015-22) but failed to dislodge them. Yemen suffered a humanitarian catastrophe and Saudi territory remained within range of Houthi weapons. That experience destroyed the illusion that air power can produce stable political outcomes. A direct war with Iran will produce a far worse outcome and Riyadh knows it.

It is this very reading of the situation that underpinned Mohammed bin Salman’s phone call to Trump on 2 August. MBS reportedly expressed concerns about US plans to launch new attacks on Iran’s energy facilities and urged the US president to de-escalate. Saudi Arabia’s official message has emphasised dialogue and diplomatic solutions that will prevent a wider conflict in the region.

The Saudi approach should not be romanticised — its moves are strategic, not pacifist. Which makes their restraint even more instructive. Saudi leaders are not appealing for peace because they trust Iran or because they hate wars.

At the centre of their calculations is Mohammed bin Salman’s ‘Vision 2030’ blueprint, his promise to transform Saudi Arabia from an overwhelmingly oil-dependent State into a hub of investments in technology, tourism, entertainment and logistics. That project requires political stability. Foreign investors will not commit capital to resorts, industrial zones, digital infrastructure and futuristic cities if missiles can close airports, damage energy facilities or interrupt shipping without warning.

War will also inevitably worsen fiscal pressures. Higher oil prices can temporarily increase revenue, but this advantage disappears if production facilities or export routes are damaged.

Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has already forced greater reliance on the east-to-west pipeline and Red Sea terminals. Houthi threats around the Bab el-Mandeb expose the alternative route. Saudi Arabia can try to diversify supply lines and suppliers but it cannot relocate itself.

A prolonged conflict would undermine the social bargain. Economic diversification is expected to create employment for a young population, expand opportunities and reduce dependence on public spending. War will redirect resources towards defence; it will delay projects, deter tourism and weaken employment growth, and damage the monarchy’s internal legitimacy.

Riyadh also understands that the US can escalate a conflict without accepting responsibility for its long aftermath. American forces can strike and withdraw whereas Saudi Arabia must live alongside Iran, manage relations with Iraq and Yemen and protect trade routes every day. Geography imposes a discipline on Saudi strategy.

The reconciliation agreement with Iran brokered by China in 2023 was an early expression of this realism. It did not end Saudi–Iran rivalry, but it reopened diplomatic channels and provided mechanisms to head off crises.

India should study this approach carefully. Its economic and security exposure to the Gulf is substantial. India depends heavily on the region for energy, fertiliser supplies and maritime trade. Millions of Indian citizens work in Gulf countries, supporting families at home through remittances. The closure of Hormuz has raised energy and shipping costs, while disruptions in fertiliser supplies threaten farmers and food prices.

New Delhi has no defensible interest in treating the war as an opportunity to advertise solidarity with Israel or align itself with the UAE’s more confrontational preferences. India cannot stop the war alone, but it can work with Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Turkey and other States to seek de-escalation. It can maintain direct contact with Iran and urge Washington to pursue diplomacy. India’s silence and partisan alignment is hurting its strategic influence and the costs of war continue to hit Indian consumers, workers and businesses.

Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden. More by the author here