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Why is China buying specialised military equipment from Russia?

Leaked papers show that Moscow sold parachute systems, amphibious vehicles and training that may fast‑track China’s airborne options for Taiwan invasion

Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un in Beijing
Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un in Beijing @dwnews/X

A London defence forum has accessed clandestine Russian documents which indicate that Moscow is selling military kit and know‑how to Beijing that could assist preparations for an airborne operation against Taiwan.

The Royal United Services Institute’s (RUSI) review draws on roughly 800 pages of material — contracts and equipment lists — leaked by a group calling itself 'Black Moon'. The forum shared some of the files with the Associated Press and judged them likely genuine, while acknowledging parts may have been removed or changed; AP could not independently verify them.

The papers, a mix of final and draft documents, detail meetings between Chinese and Russian delegations, visits to Moscow and schedules for payment and delivery of high‑altitude parachute systems and amphibious assault vehicles. They indicate Russia has begun work on items to be supplied but do not show direct evidence that China has paid or taken delivery.

RUSI’s authors say the equipment could be repurposed for an attack on Taiwan. Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has launched a wide modernisation of its armed forces aiming to become a 'world‑class' military by 2050.

High‑ranking US officials have signalled Beijing may be ordered to prepare for a possible Taiwan invasion as early as 2027; China maintains the self‑governing island is part of its territory and has not ruled out force.

The documents do not mention Taiwan by name, but the RUSI analysis argues the technologies — notably advanced parachuting capabilities — would be useful for mounting an airborne assault and could shorten the time needed to field such forces.

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Russian combat experience, logistics and battle insights

The Kremlin, and defence and foreign ministries in Beijing and Taipei, did not immediately reply to requests for comment by the Associated Press.

RUSI highlights that beyond hardware the chief value for China may lie in training and command‑and‑control procedures: "The greatest value of the deal to China is likely in the training and procedures for command and control of parachute forces, because Russia has combat experience," whereas China doesn't, write Danylyuk and co‑author Jack Watling.

The analysts argue Moscow’s commercial motive is twofold: to establish itself as a weapons supplier to China and to fund its war in Ukraine. Danylyuk also suggested Russia might hope to entangle Beijing in a confrontation with Washington over Taiwan, diverting US attention from Ukraine.

Although China’s overall military capability exceeds Russia’s in many areas, RUSI says gaps exist that Russian kit and expertise could fill. Song Zhongping, a Beijing military commentator, conceded China’s hardware is superior but noted: "Russia has more combat experience."

Wen‑Ti Sung of the Atlantic Council said parachute insertions would probably support logistics rather than be the decisive element.

"Parachuting in forces would probably support the logistics of any invasion but would be unlikely to be the 'main event'," he said, adding Beijing may reverse‑engineer systems for broader uses such as advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

One leaked document dated September 2024 refers back to an initial 2021 agreement and sets out payment and delivery stages. It states phases one and two — technical analysis, software tweaks and manufacture — have been completed. Russia is reported to have agreed to provide training on Chinese soil and to supply a full airborne battalion’s equipment, including capacity for special‑forces infiltration.

Listed items include 37 light amphibious assault vehicles, 11 amphibious anti‑tank self‑propelled guns and 11 airborne armoured personnel carriers, plus command and observation vehicles, at a total cost above $210m. The files say Beijing wants the vehicles fitted with Chinese communications and able to use Chinese ammunition.

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High altitude parachute systems

RUSI says Russia also agreed to sell systems capable of parachuting loads up to 190kg from very high altitude.

Minutes from a 8 March 2024 meeting in Moscow refer to tests of the systems down to –60°C and to Beijing’s request to trial drops from 8,000 metres.

These highly speicialised Russian systems are known Dalnolyot.

Such heights, the report notes, could allow gliding ranges of up to 80km, enabling "Chinese special forces groups to penetrate the territory of other countries without being noticed."

Danylyuk suggested the Dalnolyot could be used for a 'stage zero' landing in Taiwan — covertly inserting personnel and kit from aircraft operating outside Taiwanese airspace.

RUSI also points out that Russia’s own airborne operations have not always succeeded. In February 2022, Russian special forces’ attempts to seize Hostomel airfield near Kyiv failed when helicopters were struck before they reached the site, and other efforts to secure air bases likewise faltered.

Western analysts have argued the lack of a functioning air bridge helped turn what Moscow expected to be a rapid victory into a prolonged war.

Despite those battlefield setbacks, Moscow has tapped Soviet‑era stocks and ramped up weapons production — and, RUSI notes, that has not prevented Russia from marketing equipment to China.

The report adds the parachute kit described would be required specifically for 'the invasion stage,' which Russia does not need for its campaign in Ukraine.

Finally, the analysts warn China’s operational challenge in an attempt on Taiwan would be to achieve what Russia could not: suppressing air defences and landing enough troops and materiel to defeat Taiwan’s forces before mobilisation. One suggested option in the report is airdropping armoured vehicles onto golf courses close to ports and airfields to establish corridors for follow‑on landings.

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