Turbulent ties, broken bridges

To say that relations between India and Bangladesh are currently tense will be an understatement. It is difficult to apportion blame, but both sides seem equally intent on distancing themselves from each other. The connectivity corridor which India and Bangladesh had worked hard to build is no longer in use. The withdrawal of tourist visas and numerous trade facilities by both countries has led to a sharp decline in bilateral trade, which had seen a high of nearly $18 billion in 2021-22.

India has revoked a 2020 agreement that permitted Bangladesh to use Indian Land Customs Stations (LCSs), ports and airports for the transshipment of goods to third countries. In May 2025, India stopped the entry of readymade garments from Bangladesh through land transit posts in the northeast. This was followed in June 2025 by severe import restrictions on jute and related products — henceforth permitted into India only through the Nhava Sheva port in Navi Mumbai.

In response to India’s ban on land routes, Pakistan was quick to offer Bangladesh the use of its Karachi port. There was also some chatter about Bangladesh buying Pakistani fighter jets and the restoration of direct flights between Dhaka and Karachi.

While the ousted prime minister Sheikh Hasina disallowed ‘anti-India activity’, the interim government feels no such pressure. Additionally, Bangladesh’s invite to China to build infrastructure close to India’s sensitive border in the Dooars region (the Teesta masterplan) didn’t make India happy.

Both countries seem to be working overtime to ensure that bilateral ties remain as limited as ever. Bangladesh was upset when India cold-shouldered a request from interim government head Prof. Muhammad Yunus for a bilateral meeting.

India, in turn, was miffed over the chief advisor’s visit to China and his public statements there. In July 2025, when a Bangladesh Air Force fighter jet crashed into a school in Dhaka’s Diabari area, killing 27 people and injuring over 170, Bangladesh requested medical assistance from India. The team of burn specialists from Delhi did arrive but was initially not allowed to treat patients, simply observe.

Just when the Indian external affairs minister’s presence at former prime minister Khaleda Zia’s funeral sent out positive signals, there came the ill-advised and ill-timed diktat to drop Bangladeshi cricketer Mustafizur Rahman from one of the Indian Premium League teams (Kolkata Knight Riders). The Bangladesh Cricket Board’s security concerns and refusal to play in the ICC T20 World Cup coincided with India notifying Bangladesh as a ‘non-family posting’ for diplomats, citing similar security concerns.

India’s increasingly shrill rhetoric about ‘illegal Bangladeshis’ — which has found considerable traction in the Bangladesh-bordering states of West Bengal and Assam — and exaggerated claims in mainstream India media about the persecution of Hindus in Bangladesh have also kept temperatures high.

Volatile shifts in the relationship were to be expected when India granted asylum to Sheikh Hasina, who was forced to flee Bangladesh on 5 August 2024. The outpouring of anti-India fury, attacks on the Indian High Commission and social media campaigns on both sides aggravated the schism.

The shock of losing its closest partner in the neighbourhood altered the way India looked at Bangladesh. Repeated attacks on minorities, mobs on the streets and the move to ban Awami League’s political activities deepened distrust.

The interim government’s move to lift the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami and its tendency to turn a blind eye to rowdy Islamist elements further contributed to the hostility.

The recent audio leak of a conversation between a US diplomat and journalists in Dhaka, as reported by Washington Post, added another twist to an already volatile cocktail, suggesting as it did the US warming up to the Jamaat.

Students and the youth in Bangladesh have always disliked Hasina’s pro-India tilt. They have been increasingly outspoken in their impression of India as a bully with double standards.

A joke circulating in New Delhi says a lot about the corner India finds itself in. Policy analysts have been quipping that the Awami League is about to be recognised as a political party in India.

It is in India, after all, that a large number of former ministers and senior Awami League leaders have taken refuge. They would not have been able to do so without the knowledge, if not consent, of the government in New Delhi. Judging by the number of press conferences being addressed by Awami League leaders in India — as campaigning intensifies for the 12 February elections in Bangladesh — the joke may be closer to the bone than we realise.

Sheikh Hasina’s activities from India have complicated relations further. Bangladesh is aggrieved that she is allowed to address press conferences online and comment freely on political developments in Bangladesh. The interim government had sent a note verbale requesting her extradition which India did not deem necessary to respond to.

While the verdict of the International Criminal Tribunal of Bangladesh — ironically established by Sheikh Hasina — in holding her guilty of ‘crimes against humanity’ and sentencing her to death is problematic, it has renewed the clamour for her extradition. India’s stony silence on this issue intensified anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh and was amplified on social media.

The popular perception of India being supportive of the Hasina government has been reinforced by India’s seeming reluctance to address Bangladesh’s core concerns: water sharing and border killings. Sooner rather than later, India will have to take a clearer stand on how much liberty it can extend to Sheikh Hasina and Awami leaders exiled in India.

Despite the Awami League being banned from participating in forthcoming elections in Bangladesh, its shadow looms large. The outcome will depend in no small measure on which side supporters tilt in an evolving electoral equation. The perception that India is interfering in the election has been reinforced by allowing Sheikh Hasina to address her supporters and air her concerns from India.

The golden days are undoubtedly over. Both Dhaka and Delhi need to remember that ground realities have changed. India will not tolerate security threats, real or perceived, and Bangladesh’s engagement with external powers will add to India’s discomfiture.

The harsh reality is that neither country can prosper without the other. Bangladesh must realise that what India offers cannot be easily replaced. India must recognise that tit-for-tat measures are poor strategy and poorer diplomacy, and that it is in the interest of both Delhi and Dhaka to reset their ties.

Sreeradha Datta is a professor at Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University and non-resident senior fellow, ISAS-NUS, Singapore