Border security needs Indian Army to rebuild ties with Gujjar, Bakarwal tribes

With terror groups now shifting to higher ridges as safe havens — a tactic strikingly reminiscent of what military experts witnessed during the Kargil War of 1999 — analysts argue the Indian Army must rethink its strategies and rebuild critical alliances with Gujjar and Bakarwal nomadic tribes, historically celebrated as the “eyes and ears” of India’s mountain borders.

During the Kargil War, Gujjar and Bakarwal shepherds played an instrumental role in alerting the Army to suspicious infiltrations by Pakistani troops along the Line of Control (LoC), an act that helped trigger Operation Vijay to reclaim the vital high ground in Ladakh. Their deep-rooted knowledge of the rugged Pir Panjal and Kargil terrains and their unwavering loyalty were pivotal to India’s success in high-altitude warfare—where timely information from local allies could spell the difference between victory and defeat.

This close partnership — cemented during moments of national crisis like Kargil — has continued through the decades, with Gujjar and Bakerwal communities aiding the Army in combating insurgency and defending remote regions. Their patriotism remains legendary, seen in the heroics of figures such as Rukhsana Kausar and Rifleman Aurangzeb, whose sacrifices echo the spirit of ordinary villagers whose alerts proved decisive in 1999.

However, experts now warn of a serious trust deficit. Recent incidents, including the Kathua rape case (2018), the Amshipura fake encounter (2020), and most recently, civilian deaths in Topa Pir (2023), have strained ties — causing a "dangerous intelligence gap on the ground".

Army responses, such as the dismissal of officers, have done little to heal old wounds, and official inquiries repeatedly cite how the effectiveness of reconnaissance and intelligence on border security depends on restoring confidence among these key communities.

Systemic issues, such as restrictive policies and diminishing rights to forest lands, have further marginalised Gujjar and Bakerwal nomads, reducing their presence in strategic regions once crucial for both peace and wartime surveillance.

The lack of stable communication infrastructure and dwindling contact with the Army now risks undermining a relationship that has in the past proven vital to India’s ability to counter cross-border infiltration and scale the formidable Himalayan ridges.

Voices within the community and Indian security establishment stress that “somewhere, I don’t think we’ve done justice to their role”.

Former Northern Command chief Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda recalls, “We should remember that the first women Village Defence Committee (VDC) members were from Gujjar and Bakerwal tribes from Murah Kalalli village in Surnakote.” Their contributions were crucial in operations such as Sarp Vinash (2003) and during the Kargil War, too, their alerts were key in detecting enemy movements in high-altitude warfare.

Retired Lt. Gen. Paramjit Singh Sangha also highlighted, “It’s essential to avoid actions that alienate them”, echoing the need to restore old bonds that historically turned border populations from passive bystanders to “first line of defence” — a lesson India was forced to particularly reckon with during the dramatic events of 1999.

Expressing concern over the growing “trust deficit”, Shahnawaz Choudhary — a senior Gujjar leader and a local AICC secretary, said the communities have not been given due value.

The Congress leader highlighted the issue of outstanding rights to forest lands that the Gujjar and Bakerwal communities have not yet received individual claims for, though they have been grazing cattle on these lands for a very long time.

Choudhary also mentioned the Topo Pir incident, something he feels was manipulated by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which broke the trust of the community and made the youth feel ignored by both the Army and the Jammu and Kashmir administration.

He warned of a "widening void" between the locals, the nomads and the Army and administration, and flagged the latter’s inaction on the ground as a contributing factor in the discontent.

Tribal researcher Javaid Rahi too acknowledged the communication gap and noted that "it takes two hands to clap". While he praised the Army's efforts on behalf of the communities, he stressed that various lapses have created a need for a uniform policy across units along the Line of Control. Yet, consistency is vital for maintaining trust, he said.

"The sacrifices made by these two communities [Gujjar and Bakherwal] are immense," Rahi said, urging that these contributions be highlighted to inspire future generations.

Rahi also suggested various steps towards reconciliation, such as consistently honouring prominent Gujjar figures for their bravery, safeguarding their neighbourhoods and building a museum to honour their history and sacrifices.

Dr Zamarrud Mughal, a doctorate in Urdu who runs a news portal operated out of the Chenab valley, feels there is no wedge between the Gujjar and Bakerwal communities and the Army however.

He said, "They are angry over reservation, but that is one of the issues. The BJP had to pay the cost for it in the assembly elections."

Over a period of time, however, "[their] contact with general [sic] people has come down to virtually zero", he added.

Yet, amidst all the communities’ drifting and distance, the mountainous territories from the Poonch ridges through Peer Gali to Surankote Jhadanwali Gali remain as remote now as they were in the Kargil era.

Reconciliation and trust-building with local and nomadic communities, therefore, is not only critical for safeguarding peace near the nation’s borderlands, but also for preserving lessons from past conflicts where community collaboration turned the tide in India’s favour.

With PTI inputs