Who can(not) have a nuclear weapon

As US and Israeli bombs and missiles rained on Iranian cities and nuclear facilities, the justification they offered was both familiar and revealing: Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon. The military action, sanctions, assassinations and flagrant violation of international law were all ‘necessary to prevent a future nuclear threat’.

The US claims to defend the global non-proliferation regime, yet it has spent decades shielding West Asia’s only nuclear-armed state — Israel. The same Western governments that condemn Iran’s nuclear ambitions have tolerated, financed and concealed Israel’s clandestine nuclear arsenal. If Iran can’t have nuclear weapons, how is it okay for Israel to have them?

Iran remains a threshold nuclear state. Despite decades of suspicion and hostility, US intelligence assessments have repeatedly concluded that Iran has not made a political decision to build a nuclear bomb. It possesses the technological capability to do so, but capability is not the same as possession. More recent US intelligence assessments have again concluded that Iran has still not embarked on the project to get nuclear weapons. Yet it is Iran that faces bombing campaigns, economic strangulation, cyber warfare, sabotage operations and targeted killings of scientists.

On the other hand, it is universally known and quietly acknowledged that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. Estimates place its nuclear arsenal at around 90 warheads, with sufficient fissile material to build many more.

Israel never signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It does not permit international inspections of its nuclear facilities. It has never publicly admitted that it possesses nuclear weapons, yet it has built a sophisticated nuclear deterrent, capable of delivering nuclear strikes by air, land and sea. No international body or coalition has demanded disarmament. No sanctions have followed. No military threats have been issued. Instead, Israel enjoys extraordinary protection.

For decades, successive US administrations have sidestepped any acknowledgement of the fact that Israel has nuclear weapons. The diplomatic subterfuge has gone unquestioned despite overwhelming evidence, extensive intelligence assessments, and even admissions by former US officials. Investigative reports have revealed that presidents from Richard Nixon onward effectively agreed not to challenge Israel’s nuclear status. The result is a remarkable exception to every principle the US proclaims.

The hypocrisy is not merely political but institutional as well. US law mandates sanctions against countries that acquire or test nuclear weapons outside the NPT framework. Those laws have been applied selectively against rivals and adversaries.

Iraq was invaded on false claims of possessing weapons of mass destruction. Iran has endured decades of sanctions. North Korea remains internationally isolated. But these norms do not apply to Israel.

Evidence suggests that Washington ignored Israeli procurement of nuclear material from the US, overlooked illicit acquisition networks, and even buried evidence related to Israel’s suspected nuclear test in 1979 in the ocean near the southern end of South Africa. What would certainly have triggered sanctions against any other state produced a deafening silence when Israel was involved.

After India’s nuclear tests in 1998, the US and its allies swiftly imposed economic, military and scientific sanctions in the name of non-proliferation, but Israel has never faced any of this despite its long standing clandestine programme and its refusal to join the NPT.

The contrast was staggering: India declared its nuclear capability and paid an economic and diplomatic price. Israel developed its arsenal in secrecy, remained outside the treaty system, and was rewarded with military aid, diplomatic protection and strategic partnership.

With 191 signatory states, the NPT rests on a simple bargain: states without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire them, while nuclear powers commit to eventual disarmament and equal application of the rules. That bargain becomes impossible to sustain when one state is allowed to operate outside the system with complete impunity.

Europe’s role is no less dubious. Recent investigations have revealed that a substantial portion of Israel’s nuclear infrastructure was secretly financed by West Germany during the early years of the Israeli nuclear weapons programme — the Dimona project. Billions of euros in today’s value were transferred through covert arrangements disguised as development assistance. France provided technological assistance. Germany provided crucial financial support. Together, they helped build the foundations of Israel’s nuclear capability.

Today, many of these same European governments present themselves as guardians of non-proliferation norms. Germany, in particular, has been among Israel’s most steadfast supporters while simultaneously demanding strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities. The double standard is jaw-dropping.

The consequences of this hypocrisy extend beyond Iran. No state develops an interest in nuclear deterrence in a strategic vacuum. Nations seek nuclear weapons when they perceive existential threats and a security asymmetry.

Iran’s nuclear ambitions cannot be understood separately from Israel’s undeclared arsenal. Nor can the growing interest in nuclear capabilities across West Asia and Saudi Arabia’s ‘strategic mutual defence agreement’ with Pakistan be divorced from the reality that one state already possesses the ultimate weapon while facing no international pressure to disarm.

Proliferation engenders more proliferation. The logic is straightforward. If nuclear weapons guarantee security and immunity from external meddling in sovereign affairs, more states will inevitably seek them. The lesson many governments have drawn from recent history is not that nuclear weapons are dangerous; it is that states without them are vulnerable.

Ukraine surrendered the nuclear arsenal it inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Iraq abandoned its nuclear ambitions and was invaded. Libya dismantled its weapons programme and later experienced regime change. North Korea acquired nuclear weapons and became practically untouchable. These realities shape strategic calculations far more than hollow speeches about international norms.

The US actions in/on Iran are sending a dangerous message across the world: that the NPT is and will be invoked selectively to protect US allies and punish its adversaries. As long as that asymmetry persists, so will the reasons for more states to seek the nuclear deterrent.

Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden. More by the author here