Explained: How Iran’s missile-centric strategy is testing US-Israel defence capabilities

Iran has increasingly relied on a missile-centric military doctrine to challenge the United States and its regional allies, using a combination of large ballistic-missile inventories, drones, proxy forces and advanced evasion technologies to overwhelm air-defence systems across the Middle East.

The approach is centred around anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy in which Iran attempts to deny adversaries freedom in military action by threatening bases, ports and energy infrastructure across the region through mass missile strikes and coordinated proxy attacks.

The doctrine has been on display during the current escalation in the aftermath of the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei, in which Iranian retaliatory strikes have targeted US military installations and allied infrastructure in countries including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Analysts say the strategy relies on numerical missile salvos combined with technological improvements in guidance, manoeuvrability and survivability.

Diversified missile arsenal

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force operates a wide range of ballistic missiles capable of striking targets across the Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean.

Short-range ballistic missiles such as the Fateh-110 and Fateh-313 can strike targets between 300 km and 500 km away with an estimated circular error probable (CEP) of about 10–100 metres.

Other short-range systems including the Zolfaghar missile (range around 700 km, CEP roughly 10–30 metres) and the Qiam-1 and Qiam-2 missiles (700–800 km range) allow Iran to target US bases and allied infrastructure across the Gulf region.

These systems are capable of reaching countries such as Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, all of which host US military installations.

Medium-range ballistic missiles extend Iran’s strike reach further into the region.

Iran’s Khorramshahr missile series is a heavy medium-range ballistic missile designed for high-payload strategic strikes. With a range of about 2,000 km and payload up to 1.5–1.8 tonnes, it can carry large conventional or potential multi-warhead payloads, allowing Iran to hit Israel, Gulf bases and regional infrastructure with fewer launches.

Systems such as the Shahab-3 and Ghadr missiles can reach distances of approximately 1,300–1,800 km, while the Emad missile (range about 1,700 km) incorporates a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle designed to improve accuracy during the terminal phase of flight.

Iran’s Sejjil missile, a two-stage solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missile, can reach targets up to about 2,000 km away, enabling Iran to strike locations across the Middle East, including Israel.

More recent systems such as the Haj Qasem missile (approximately 1,400 km range) and the Kheibar Shekan missile (around 1,450 km range with reported accuracy below 20 metres) use solid fuel and satellite navigation guidance and incorporate manoeuvrable warheads intended to evade missile defences.

Hypersonic and manoeuvrable threats

Iran has also announced the development of hypersonic-capable missiles. The Fattah-1 and Fattah-2 systems reportedly have ranges between 1,400 km and 1,800 km and can reach speeds estimated at Mach 13–15 during flight.

These missiles are designed with manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles and rocket-motor-assisted terminal guidance, allowing them to change trajectory during the final phase of flight in order to evade interceptors.

Guidance systems combining inertial navigation and satellite signals are believed to give these weapons a potential impact accuracy estimated at 10–25 metres.

In addition to ballistic missiles, Iran deploys long-range cruise missiles and drones as part of hybrid strike packages.

Cruise missiles such as the Hoveyzeh and Paveh have ranges estimated between 1,350 km and 1,650 km and fly at low altitudes to avoid radar detection. Unmanned aerial systems such as the Shahed-136 and Shahed-238 drones can travel distances of up to about 2,000 km and are often launched in large numbers to complicate air-defence responses.

Role of proxy forces

Iran’s regional allies significantly expand its strike capacity. Hezbollah in Lebanon is estimated to possess tens of thousands of rockets and missiles, including variants of the Fateh missile family capable of reaching deep into Israel.

In Yemen, Houthi forces have deployed missiles and drones derived from Iranian designs, enabling strikes against targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Analysts say this network allows Tehran to project military pressure across multiple fronts without directly launching every attack from Iranian territory.

Countering allied air defences

US allies rely on layered air-defence systems to counter these threats. Israel operates a multi-layered network that includes Arrow-3 for high-altitude interception and David’s Sling and Iron Dome for medium- and short-range threats.

Gulf states host US-supplied systems such as Patriot PAC-3 interceptors and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which can intercept ballistic missiles during their terminal phase. US naval forces in the region also operate Aegis-equipped warships capable of missile defence.

Iran attempts to counter these defences using several methods. Large missile and drone barrages are designed to saturate radar and interceptor systems. Analysts say that coordinated attacks involving hundreds of projectiles can strain defensive networks and create opportunities for some missiles to penetrate.

Missile manoeuvrability is another factor. Warheads capable of altering their trajectory during re-entry complicate interception by “hit-to-kill” interceptors, which rely on predicting a target’s path.

Iran has also invested heavily in survivability measures for its missile forces. Many missiles are launched from mobile transporter-erector-launcher vehicles that can quickly change locations. Iran has also built extensive underground missile storage and launch facilities, often referred to as “missile cities”, designed to protect launch systems from air strikes.

Foreign assistance and technology

Russian assistance has included advanced radar and air-defence technologies. Iran has reportedly deployed components of the S-400 Triumf air defence system around sensitive facilities. The system uses the 91N6E “Big Bird” long-range surveillance radar, capable of detecting targets at distances up to 600 km, and the 92N6E “Grave Stone” engagement radar, which can track and guide interceptors toward multiple targets simultaneously.

S-400 systems can employ 40N6 and 48N6 interceptor missiles, capable of engaging aircraft and ballistic missiles at long ranges.

Russia has also supplied Rezonans-NE over-the-horizon radar systems, which are designed to detect stealth aircraft and ballistic missiles at extended distances.

In addition to air defence support, Russia has provided propellant precursor chemicals used in missile production.

China has played an equally significant role in Iran’s missile ecosystem, particularly in navigation and surveillance systems.

Iranian precision missiles rely heavily on signals from the BeiDou-3 satellite navigation system, China’s alternative to the US GPS network. BeiDou provides encrypted navigation signals that improve missile accuracy and enable mid-course corrections.

Chinese technology has also supported Iranian missile production through the supply of sodium perchlorate, a key oxidiser used in solid rocket propellant. Reports suggest deliveries of thousands of tonnes of the chemical could support the production of hundreds of solid-fuel missiles.

China’s Yaogan satellite constellation, which includes optical, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and signals intelligence satellites, provides valuable reconnaissance data that can assist in targeting.

Iran has also begun deploying its own military satellites. Systems such as Noor-3 and Mahda provide basic electro-optical surveillance and communications capability, while Tehran has announced plans for a larger Soleimani satellite constellation intended to improve real-time targeting and battlefield coordination.

These combined capabilities create a complex command-and-control architecture linking satellites, ground radars and missile launchers. The typical strike chain involves satellite reconnaissance identifying targets, ground-based radar confirmation and mobile launchers firing missile salvos coordinated with drone attacks or proxy strikes.

From western Iran, missiles can reach Gulf targets in roughly five to ten minutes, leaving limited reaction time for defensive systems.

Even if most incoming projectiles are intercepted, a small percentage penetrating defences can still produce strategic effects by damaging infrastructure, disrupting energy supplies or causing casualties.

Iran’s missile doctrine therefore does not depend on overwhelming destruction. Instead, it aims to impose persistent strategic pressure by exploiting geography, missile volume, technological support from foreign partners and the ability to launch coordinated strikes across multiple fronts.

For military planners watching the conflict unfold, the message is clear: Iran’s missile-driven warfare model is designed to make the Middle East one of the most difficult operational environments for US and allied forces.